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This paper estimates the economic and non-economic returns to volunteering for
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full-time work. On average, working for free increases lifetime earnings by 16.7%. The
economic returns to volunteering are more important than the non-economic returns in
increasing lifetime utility. The model also reveals an adverse selection mechanism into
volunteering that helps explain why reduced-form regressions of the returns to working
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1 Introduction
Working for free is a widespread economic activity. Data from the 2005 Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) reveal that 32.7% of the prime-aged US population engaged in
unpaid work for non-profit organizations in the preceding year. This surprisingly high inci-
dence of volunteering is not unique to the US. It is found in many other advanced economies
as well. Despite the worldwide prevalence of volunteer work, the reason people choose to
donate their time is not yet well understood. Identifying the main motivations underlying
the decision to work for free is important. It can help make sense of charitable responses
to changes in economic conditions. It can also aid in designing incentive schemes aimed at
influencing the supply of volunteer labor.
Previous research by economists has focussed on two main motivations for donating labor.
The first is referred to as the consumption motive. It is an intrinsic motivation associated
with a direct increase in current utility. The price of consuming (or cost of supplying)
volunteer hours is the opportunity cost of time which could have been devoted to paid work
or leisure. The second is referred to as the investment motive. It is associated with an
indirect increase in future utility. Supplying volunteer hours today may expand networks,
signal productive characteristics or raise human capital levels which enhance future earnings
potential.
In an early empirical study on donated labor, Menchik and Weisbrod (1987) analyze each
of these two volunteering motives in isolation. In one model, only the consumption motive
is operative. In the other, the investment motive drives volunteering. The estimation results
suggest that both motivations are important and the opportunity cost of volunteer time is
substantial. In contrast, Freeman (1997) fails to confirm the importance of the consumption
motive, and does not find a strong relationship between the propensity to volunteer and
alternative paid work opportunities.
The conclusions reached in these two leading studies, and in essentially the entire lit-
erature on volunteer labor supply, should be considered highly tentative for at least three
reasons.1 First, the expected future monetary payoﬀ to volunteer experience is not incorpo-
rated into the decision problem. This is mainly due to data limitations. The data sources
rarely contain suﬃcient information on an individual’s post-volunteer employment status or
earnings. Second, foregone earnings in paid employment options are treated as exogenous.
This yields biased estimates of the opportunity cost of time. Third, marital status and the
presence of children, both key determinants of the propensity to volunteer, are not recognized
1While there is a vast number of studies on the charitable giving of money, the economics literature on
volunteering is extremely limited. See Andreoni (2006) for a short review.
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as endogenous.
In this study, all three of these major problems in the literature are explicitly addressed.
The focus is on a woman’s decision to work for free, using comprehensive longitudinal data
from the PSID. Between the years 2001 and 2005, the PSID collected information on vol-
unteering for non-profit organizations. These data are well suited for identifying the two
volunteering motives and the opportunity cost of time. Crucial for identification, the data
contain individual-level transitions between unpaid and paid employment states as well as
pre- and post-volunteering earnings.
The theoretical framework used to interpret the data assumes that each woman, be-
tween the ages of 25 and 55, maximizes the discounted present value of expected lifetime
utility by making joint and sequential decisions on unpaid and paid employment status. It
is particularly appropriate in this context to formulate the decision problem as a dynamic
program since the investment motive is naturally forward-looking. Because wage oﬀer func-
tions in paid employment options are estimated simultaneously with the decision to work
for free, the model also produces selection-corrected estimates of volunteer experience and
the opportunity cost of time. In the spirit of Keane and Wolpin (2010), the endogeneity
of non-labor income and family composition are accounted for by modeling marriage and
conception choices jointly with labor supply decisions.
The dynamic decision model nests the consumption and investment motives for vol-
unteering into one unified framework, providing an empirical strategy for estimating their
relative importance. This is the first study to oﬀer relative importance estimates. It is ac-
complished by separating the contemporaneous utility flow into two main components. The
first component is CRRA in household consumption, representing the investment motive or
the economic returns to volunteering. The second component is additively separable and
captures the consumption motive or the non-economic returns to working for free.
This study also employs a novel approximate solution technique for discrete choice dy-
namic programming (DCDP) models. The approximate solution technique combines ap-
proaches proposed by Keane and Wolpin (1994) and Geweke and Keane (1995). The simu-
lated maximum likelihood (SML) procedure used to estimate the parameters of the model,
originally developed by Keane and Wolpin (2001) and made more general by Keane and
Sauer (2009,2010), is further extended in this study by including probabilities of survey non-
response in the likelihood. Thus, the estimation procedure accounts for the initial conditions
problem, incorporates measurement error in discrete and continuous outcomes, and corrects
for potential biases due to non-random missingness/attrition.
The SML estimates of the model indicate that the economic returns to working for free
are substantial. An additional year of volunteer experience raises wage oﬀers by 8.5% in
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future part-time work and by 2.6% in future full-time work. On average, working for free
increases lifetime earnings by 16.7%. These estimates are more plausible than the negative
wage returns generally produced by reduced-form regressions. In fact, the decision model
reveals a negative selection mechanism that helps explain why reduced-form estimates of the
wage returns to volunteering will likely be downward biased.
The model conceptualizes volunteer work as the optimal choice whenever the non-economic
returns and expected future economic returns suﬃciently outweigh the disutility of unpaid
work eﬀort and volunteering-related childcare costs. According to the estimates, this oc-
curs most often amongst highly educated women who also have low unobserved market-
productivity. Highly educated women place greater value on the non-economic returns, and
conditional on education, lower market-productivity implies greater benefits from future wage
returns. This is because low market-productivity leads to low wage oﬀers, low consumption
levels, and a high marginal utility of consumption. Heterogeneity in the marginal utility of
consumption emerges as a result of the estimated curvature of the consumption component
of utility. Once this negative selection based on unobserved market-productivity diﬀerences
and diﬀerential marginal utilities is accounted for, the wage returns to volunteering become
positive and substantial in magnitude.
The estimation results also reveal that the economic returns to working for free are rela-
tively more important than the non-economic returns in increasing lifetime utility. In other
words, the investment motive outweighs the consumption motive. The economic returns ac-
count for 73.5% of the overall increase in lifetime utility due to volunteer experience. Using
the model estimates in a policy experiment, interpreted as the introduction of a tax credit
for volunteering-related childcare costs, shows that a full tax credit generates a 23% increase
in volunteer labor supply and a 1.9% increase in mean lifetime earnings. The increase in
mean lifetime earnings amongst volunteers covers approximately 25% of the mean cost of
providing tax relief.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the PSID data
used in estimation. Section 3 presents the model and solution method. Section 4 outlines
the estimation procedure and discusses identification. Section 5 highlights key parameter
estimates. Section 6 explains the negative selection mechanism, measures the relative im-
portance of the investment and consumption motives, and evaluates the introduction of a
tax credit for volunteering-related childcare expenses. Section 7 summarizes and enumerates
several extensions of the model that could be incorporated in future research.
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2 Data
The data are drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), including both the
core random sample and the nonrandom Survey of Economic Opportunity. PSID families
were interviewed annually between 1968 and 1997, and biennially thereafter. Between 2001
and 2005, the PSID introduced questions on volunteer work for charitable organizations.
After the 2005 wave, the volunteering questions were dropped, due to a lack of funding
(charitable donations).
The three PSID waves between 2001 and 2005 contain a total of 7,778 female household
heads or spouses. Restricting the sample to those aged 25 to 55 reduces the number of
women to 4,254. The age restriction is imposed to avoid explicitly modeling education and
retirement decisions. Women aged 25 to 55 who are students, retired, disabled, or in jail at
any time during the three waves are dropped, as are those for whom it is impossible to infer
education level or marital status. These latter restrictions reduce the number of women to
3,664. For computational tractability, black women are excluded from the analysis. This
yields a sample of 2,479 women who responded to at least one survey wave between 2001
and 2005.2
The meaning of volunteering for a charitable organization is made explicit in the PSID.
The questionnaire states that charitable organizations “include religious or non-profit orga-
nizations that help those in need or that serve and support the public interest. They range
in size from national organizations like the United Way and the American Red Cross down
to local community organizations. They serve a variety of purposes such as religious activity,
helping people in need, health care and medical research, education, arts, environment, and
international aid.”
Volunteering is defined for respondents as “spending time doing unpaid work and not just
belonging to an organization. Volunteers are involved in many activities such as coaching,
helping at school, serving on committees, building and repairing, providing health care or
emotional support, delivering food, doing oﬃce work, organizing activities, fund-raising, and
other kinds of work done for no pay.”
In the 2001 wave, respondents are asked to provide the total number of hours volunteered
in the previous year, as well as the subset of hours donated to charitable organizations
that help the needy. In the 2003 and 2005 waves, the volunteering questions changed.
Respondents are requested to provide the number of hours in the previous year donated to
2Approximately 90 percent of the excluded cases follow from the age and race restrictions, implying that
any induced sample selection biases are likely to be small. It is worth noting that women report volunteering
more often than men across all age and education groups and other major demographic characteristics (35%
vs. 30%). Future work can analyze the importance of gender and race diﬀerences.
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each of seven diﬀerent types of charitable organizations.
Summary statistics on volunteer hours per week, computed from the annual totals, are
presented in Table 1. The top panel shows that the distribution of non-zero volunteer hours
in 2000 is markedly diﬀerent from the distributions in 2002 and 2004. In particular, the
mean, median and standard deviation in 2000 are all considerably lower than in subsequent
years. The bottom panel displays the percentage of non-zero volunteer hours donated to
charitable organizations in diﬀerent categories. In 2000, 12.4% of total volunteer hours went
to help the needy, with the rest going to all other unspecified types of organizations. Pooling
over 2002 and 2004, only 4.2% of total volunteer hours went to help the needy. The rest
were mainly donated to religious organizations (41%) and organizations that aid children or
youth (35.2%).
Because of the change in the volunteering questions and its influence on the distribu-
tion of annual hours and organization type, as well as other documented problems with the
hours data (see Wilhelm (2008)), only the extensive margin of volunteering is considered.
Specifically, categories of charitable organizations are pooled and a woman is classified as
volunteering for the year if annual volunteer hours are greater than zero. This crude classi-
fication is consistent with the volunteering question re-introduced into the 2011 wave of the
PSID, which simply asks whether the respondent volunteered in the previous year.
Women are also classified into paid work categories in each year depending on reported
annual work hours and labor earnings. Part-time employment is assigned if annual paid
work hours are greater than zero and less than or equal to 1750, and labor earnings are
either greater than zero or missing. If annual paid work hours are greater than 1750 and
labor earnings are greater than zero or missing, full-time employment is assigned. A woman
is classified as non-employed for the year if she did not work for free or engage in paid work.
According to these assignment rules, a woman can be classified as both employed in
a paid job and working for free in the same year. In fact, the overwhelming majority of
volunteering is in conjunction with paid work. However, it is possible that some of these
women are volunteering and engaging in paid work at distinct times within a year. For this
reason, and other possible assignment errors related to mis-reported paid work hours, it is
important to incorporate classification error into the estimation procedure.
Sample means and standard deviations for key variables in the analysis are displayed in
column (1) of Table 2. Columns (2) and (3) split the sample by frequency of survey response.
Several substantial diﬀerences between women who respond in every wave and those who do
not can be clearly discerned. Women who do not respond in every wave, constituting 14%
of the sample, are much less likely to volunteer. They also work full-time more often, are
more likely to be single, have fewer children, and have lower-earning husbands. These sharp
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diﬀerences highlight the importance of accounting for endogenous missingness/attrition in
estimation.
The employment choice distribution by age range, over six mutually exclusive employment
states, is shown in Table 3. The bottom row displays row percentages for the age range
25-55. It indicates that volunteering is rarely an exclusive activity. Only 5.1% volunteer
without holding a paid job, while 12% work part-time and volunteer, and 16.8% work full-
time and volunteer. The choice distribution does not shift substantially with age. However,
the proportion in the part-time and volunteer state does exhibit a slight inverse u-shaped
pattern.
Table 4 reports the two-year (one-wave) transition matrix for the six employment states.
The diagonal elements of the matrix range from 42.4% to 61.7%, implying a high incidence
of transitions. From the non-employed state, 23.5% transit to volunteer jobs, and from the
volunteer only state, 40.2% transit to paid employment. From the part-time and volunteer
category, the largest combined transition rate is into full-time work. From the full-time and
volunteer state, the largest transition rate is into full-time work only. Persistence is strongest
in the full-time only category.
Table 5 reports the results of several reduced-form regressions. The dependent variables
in columns (1) - (3) are indicators for having volunteered in the previous year, marital status,
and birth outcome, respectively. Estimates of linear probability models with random eﬀects
show that the incidence of working for free, being married and giving birth all increase with
education. The propensity to volunteer and to be married increases with age at a decreasing
rate, while the propensity to give birth decreases with age. The proportion volunteering and
the proportion giving birth are higher when married and increase with the stock of children
at a decreasing rate.
Note that the fraction of variance due to the random eﬀect is largest in column (2),
as there is greater persistence in marital status than in working for free or giving birth.
The relatively low persistence in the volunteer state is consistent with the high incidence
of transitions displayed in the employment transition matrix. Giving birth has virtually no
persistence after controlling for the number of children already born. Column (4) displays
the results of a regression with the log of husband wage as the dependent variable. The
estimated coeﬃcients on the woman’s education level are quite similar to those in Column
(8) using the log of female wage as the dependent variable. The fraction of variance due to
the random eﬀect is also similar. This is highly suggestive of positive assortative mating.
The OLS estimates in column (5) show that mean accepted female wages rise with ed-
ucation level, while age has a negligible eﬀect. Column (6) adds an indicator for working
for free in the previous wave as a proxy for accumulated volunteer experience. Surprisingly,
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the coeﬃcient on the volunteering dummy is -.143. Column (7) adds indicators for having
worked part-time and full-time in the previous wave, as proxies for accumulated paid work
experience. It is possible that the negative coeﬃcient on the volunteering dummy reflects
less time spent in the paid labor market rather than a negative return to volunteer work per
se. However, the coeﬃcient on lagged volunteering remains negative, -.069, and precisely
estimated. Note that the coeﬃcients on the part-time and full-time dummies are positive
and have expected relative magnitudes.
Column (8) adds random eﬀects to the specification with volunteer, part-time and full-
time experience proxies included. The coeﬃcient on the volunteering dummy weakens and
is less precisely estimated. However, the magnitude is still substantially negative, -.038.
Negative returns to volunteer experience are robust to a variety of alternative specifications,
including fixed eﬀects and reduced-form selection-correction techniques. In sharp contrast,
structural estimates of the behavioral model outlined below yield substantially positive re-
turns to volunteer experience. The estimated decision model also uncovers a mechanism
for negative selection which may underly the negative returns to volunteer experience often
found in reduced-form wage regressions.3
3 Model
A woman is assumed to maximize the expected present discounted value of remaining lifetime
utility in each period by choosing an employment state, a marital status and whether to
conceive a child. The length of a period is a year and decisions are made between the ages of
21 and 55. Women diﬀer at age 21 according to completed education level and unobserved
type. Education and unobserved type are allowed to be correlated and remain constant
throughout the decision-making horizon.
3.1 Basic Structure
The employment choice set a woman faces at each age a, denoted as K, contains six mutually
exclusive elements: non-employed (k = 1), volunteer only (k = 2), part-time only (k = 3),
full-time only (k = 4), part-time and volunteer (k = 5), and full-time and volunteer (k = 6).
3In reduced form regressions, Day and Devlin (1998) find that the wage returns to volunteering for a
religious organization in Canada are a precisely estimated -17.8%. As noted earlier, 41% of volunteer hours
in the PSID, during the years 2002 and 2004, are donated to religious organizations. Non-profits that aid
children and youth (35.2% of donated hours) may also be partially aﬃliated with religious organizations.
7
The employment choice variable, dka, k 2 K, is defined such that dka = 1 if a woman chooses
employment state k at age a and dka = 0 otherwise.
Part-time and full-time wage oﬀers, denoted by wpa and wfa , are drawn at the start of
each period from known distributions F j(wja), j = p, f . Accumulated volunteer, part-time
and full-time experience shift the means of the wage oﬀer distributions. Transitions between
employment states may occur depending on both wage draws and preference shocks.
Marital status at age a is denoted by ma, where ma = 1 if a woman is married (or
cohabiting) and ma = 0 if single (or divorced). The decision to marry is constrained by
receipt of a marriage oﬀer. The probability of receiving a marriage oﬀer at the start of the
period, when single, is denoted by ⇡m. Receipt of a marriage oﬀer is accompanied by a
random draw µ, from a known distribution F µ(µ), which partially determines the husband’s
earnings wha . Husband wages constitute a woman’s non-labor income. If the marriage oﬀer
is accepted, µ remains fixed for the duration of the marriage.
Conditional on µ, wha is drawn each year from a known distribution F h(wha). Marital
separation may occur depending on the yearly spousal wage draw. After one period of
separation, new marriage oﬀers and µ draws can once again be received. The restriction of
no “on-the-marriage” search helps generate a lower option value to marriage relative to being
single.
The fertility choice variable is denoted by ba, where ba = 1 if a child is conceived at age a
and ba = 0 otherwise. The fecundity of a woman is taken into account by constraining ba to
zero for a   46. Additional fecundity constraints are not incorporated (e.g., probability of
miscarriage). If a woman chooses to conceive at age a, live births occur with certainty before
the beginning of period a + 1. A woman can choose to conceive a child in any employment
and marital state.
Let Ua,j denote the utility flow at age a from a feasible choice combination j 2 (
 
dka
 
k2K ,ma, ba).
Ua,j is specified as CRRA in consumption Ca,j with several additively separable components,
Ua,j =
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1  
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k
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a +  
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The CRRA component of utility corresponds to the investment motive because the wage
returns to having worked for free aﬀect Ca,j. 1     is the parameter of constant relative
risk aversion.   determines the curvature of the consumption component of utility as well
as the willingness to substitute consumption inter-temporally. µk shifts the marginal utility
of consumption depending on employment state k, incorporating leisure into the utility
flow. Work eﬀort, or forgone leisure, is equivalent to a decrease in the marginal utility of
consumption. The disutility of work eﬀort is restricted such that µk = 1 when k = 1 (non-
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employed) and 0 < µk  1 for k = 2, ..., 6. Adding volunteer work on top of a paid job can
result in a lower value of µk.
The first additively separable component in (1), ga, captures the consumption motive or
the non-economic returns to volunteering. It is referred to as the warm-glow function. Kv
is the subset of K that contains the volunteering options (k = 2, 5, 6). Note that not only
is ga of direct interest, omitting it from the utility flow might lead to an upward bias in the
wage returns to volunteering.
The second additive component in (1) captures switching costs or habit persistence.
Remaining in the same employment state as in the previous period may increase utility. In
order to separate warm glow from switching costs, switching costs from volunteer jobs are
normalized to zero. The remaining terms are the utility of being married,  ma , the utility of
children,  na , and a non-employment preference shock, "ua.
The utility flow specification allows the consumption of goods, warm glow, marriage and
children to be partial substitutes, highlighting the endogeneity of marriage and fertility in
the paid/unpaid labor supply decision. In particular, low potential earnings, which lead to
decreased labor market attachment and lower consumption, can be oﬀset by working for free,
getting married (obtaining non-labor income) and having children.
Consumption at age a, or the budget constraint, is specified as
Ca,j = ⌧ma{b(d1a + d2a) + wpa(d3a + d5a) + wfa(d4a + d6a) + whama   ck} (2)
where ⌧ma is the sharing parameter. ⌧ma = 1 if ma = 0 and 0  ⌧ma  1 if ma = 1. ⌧ 1 must
be suﬃciently high to induce high wage women to marry low wage men. The lower is ⌧ 1,
the higher wha must be to compensate, encouraging positive assortative mating.
Unobserved income when non-employed or in the volunteer only state is represented by
b. b may be partially determined by unemployment insurance benefits, unobserved assets
and job search costs while non-employed or volunteering. Note that there is no additional
income when adding a volunteer job on top of paid work. Consumption could in fact be
higher in this latter state if one received in-kind benefits from volunteering such as tickets
to events or dinners, or one volunteers to help protect neighborhood property. This is not
incorporated due to lack of relevant data.
The costs of children ck in (2) are shared when married and depend on employment
state k. In particular, childcare costs can be higher when one volunteers. Childcare costs
that increase with the amount of time devoted to the labor market may be an additional
factor that discourages women with low potential earnings and children to accept full-time
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employment or engage in volunteer work.4
3.2 Additional Parameterizations
Additional parameterizations of the model involve more fully characterizing the part-time,
full-time and husband wage oﬀer functions, the warm-glow function, the utilities of marriage
and children, childcare costs, permanent unobserved heterogeneity, and the joint distribution
of productivity and preference shocks. The particular specifications adopted are motivated by
interpretability, parsimony, identification and model fit. Justifications for specific modeling
choices and robustness to various alternative parameterizations are mentioned throughout.
The final structure of the model is flexible enough to produce either positive or negative
selection into volunteering.
Wage oﬀers in part-time and full-time work are Mincer-style functions of general and
specific skills, i.e., education, accumulated work experience, and unobserved (to the econo-
metrician) productivity,
ln(wpa) =  0p +  1pE1 +  2pE2 +  3pA1 +  4pA2 +  5pA3
+ 6px
v
a +  7px
p
a +  8p(x
p
a)
2 +  9px
f
a + "
p
a (3)
ln(wfa) =  0f +  1fE1 +  2fE2 +  3fA1 +  4fA2 +  5fA3
+ 6fx
v
a +  7fx
p
a +  8fx
f
a +  9f (x
f
a)
2 + "fa
where E1 and E2 are completed education dummies (see Table 5), A1 and A2 are unobserved
time-invariant productivity eﬀects, xva is accumulated volunteer experience, xpa is accumulated
part-time experience, xfa is accumulated full-time experience, and "pa and "fa are transitory
productivity shocks. The wage returns to working for free ( 6p and  6f ) depend only on type
of job (part-time or full-time), not on observed or unobserved individual characteristics.
Additional quadratic terms and interactions are diﬃcult to identify due to lack of suﬃcient
variation in the data.
4A time constraint is not included because the µk’s partially capture this notion, and the number of volun-
teering hours observed in the data are limited. Estimates of job oﬀer, job termination and marriage “layoﬀ”
probabilities did not deviate substantially from either one or zero in previous versions. For computational
reasons, asset accumulation is not incorporated.
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The laws of motion for the experience variables are
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v
a + d
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where volunteer experience is augmented by one each year an individual works for free.
Accumulated volunteer experience does not vary by paid work status in order to limit the
size of the state space. Part-time (full-time) experience is also augmented by one each
year an individual engages in paid part-time (full-time) work. The initial conditions are
xv21 = x
p
21 = x
f
21 = 0.
The warm glow function is
ga =  0g +  1gE1 +  2gE2 +  3ga+  4gn
1,6
a +  5gn
7,18
a + "
g
a (5)
where n1,6a is the number of children between the ages of 1 and 6, n7,18a is the number of
children between the ages of 7 and 18, and "ga is a transitory preference shock. There is
no well-established theory of what determines preferences in this context. However, non-
economic returns are likely to vary with education, age and the presence of children. In
particular, education and age may proxy for peer and informational eﬀects (see Freeman
(1997)). Children of diﬀerent ages can shift the utility of volunteering for organizations that
aid children or youth, including the educational institutions of one’s own children.5
The laws of motion for n1,6a and n7,18a are
n1,6a+1 = n
1,6
a + ba   n6a (6)
n7,18a+1 = n
7,18
a + n
6
a   n18a
with initial conditions n1,621 = n
7,18
21 = 0. For purposes of normalization, children are born at
the beginning of period a+ 1 at age 1.
The potential husband’s wage oﬀer is also a Mincer-style function,
ln(wha) =  0h +  1hE1 +  2hE2 +  3ha+  4ha
2 + µ+ "ha (7)
where E1, E2 and a are the woman’s education and age. This is justified when there is a
5Unobserved type could enter the warm glow function, capturing unobserved heterogeneity in pro-social
preferences or altruistic inclinations. However, preliminary versions indicated type eﬀects are diﬀerent from
zero only in the wage oﬀer functions. Crude measures of religiosity are also omitted from the warm glow
function due to lack of suﬃcient variation.
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high degree of assortative mating, as indicated by the raw data. Excluding observed male
characteristics also economizes on the state space (see Keane and Wolpin (2010)). µ is the
unobserved husband individual eﬀect described earlier and ⌫a is a transitory productivity
shock. Inclusion of µ helps compensate for the absence of observed male characteristics in
the model.
In addition to the husband productivity shock, the utility of marriage aﬀects couple
formation and separation decisions. The utility of marriage is
 ma =  1mx
m
a (8)
where xma is marriage duration. This simple specification is suﬃcient to capture persistence
in marital status and the timing of divorce.
The law of motion in the duration of marriage is
xma+1 = x
m
a +ma (9)
with initial condition xm21 = 0.
The utility of children is
 na =  1bna +  2b(na)
2 +  3bmana +  4bma(na)
2 (10)
where na is the existing stock of children. The quadratic in na aids in reproducing the sharp
drop-oﬀ in the distribution of the number of children observed in the data. The interaction
with ma helps generate the observed diﬀerence in the stock of children by marital status.
The quadratic in na is interpretable as diminishing marginal utility in the number of kids.
The interaction with marital status allows for a possibly lower incidence of divorce when
married with children.
The law of motion in the stock of children is
na+1 = na + ba (11)
with initial condition n21 = 0. Note that if a woman chooses to conceive at age a, the number
and utility of children increase at a+1, while pregnancy and other child “start-up” costs are
incurred in period a. Thus, conceiving a child is viewed as a dynamic investment decision.
The childcare cost function depends on conception choice at age a, employment state,
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and the stock of children at diﬀerent ages,
ck =
8<: 0cba if na = 0 0cba +Pk/2Kv  kcdka (n1,6a + ↵cn7,18a ) +  vcPk2Kv dka otherwise (12)
where  0c captures pregnancy and other child start-up costs, and  kc, k /2 Kv are the per-
child costs of younger children when non-employed, working part-time and working full-time,
respectively. ↵c is the percentage change in costs for older children.  vc is the extra cost
per child when working for free. The restriction that child start-up costs and volunteering-
related childcare expenses do not vary by paid work status aids in separate identification of
the childcare cost function from other utility and budget constraint parameters.
The joint distribution of the transitory preference and productivity shocks is
 
"ua, "
g
a, "
p
a, "
f
a, "
h
a
  ⇠
N (0,⌃). ⌃ = LL0 where L is the Cholesky factor. L is restricted for identification reasons
and specified as
L =
26666664
l11 0 0 0 0
l21 l22 0 0 0
0 0 l33 0 0
0 0 l43 l44 0
0 0 0 l54 l55
37777775 (13)
allowing for heteroskedasticity and several non-zero covariances. The distribution of the per-
manent component of husband productivity is µ ⇠ N  0,  2µ  and orthogonal to  "ua, "ga, "pa, "fa, "ha .
3.3 Solution Method
At each age a, from the first decision period a = 21 until the terminal period a = 55, a
woman chooses an optimal choice combination j 2 ( dka k2K ,ma, ba) that corresponds to
the maximum over alternative-specific value functions
Va,da (⌦a) = Ua,da (⌦a) +  E (Va+1 (⌦a+1) |⌦a, da) , (14)
where da = j, ⌦a is the state space,   is the subjective discount factor and Va+1 (⌦a+1) =
maxda+1
⇥
Va+1,da+1 (⌦a+1)
⇤
. The expectation is taken over transitory shocks. A full numer-
ical solution to the DCDP model requires calculating E (Va+1 (⌦a+1) |⌦a, da) by backward
recursion for all (⌦a, da). However, since the state space is extremely large, a full numer-
ical solution is not computationally practical. Thus, an approximate solution technique is
employed.
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The novel approximate solution technique introduced in this study, referred to as the
“hybrid” method, uses simulation to calculate expected future payoﬀs, as in Keane and
Wolpin (1994), and incorporates polynomial approximation of expected future payoﬀs, as in
Geweke and Keane (1995). In the hybrid method, the alternative-specific value functions in
(14) are re-written as
Va,da (⌦a) = Ua,da
 
⌦a|✓S
 
+ Fa+1(⌦a, da|✓S, ⇡F ), (15)
where ✓S is a vector of structural parameters and ⇡F is a vector of coeﬃcients in a polynomial
function of state variables at a+ 2. Fa+1
 
⌦a, da|✓S, ⇡F
 
replaces  E (Va+1 (⌦a+1) |⌦a, da) in
(14). Fa+1
 
⌦a, da|✓S, ⇡F
 
is approximated by
Fˆa+1(⌦a, da|✓S, ⇡F ) =  Eˆ

max
da+1
 
Ua+1,da+1(⌦a+1|✓S) + F¯a+2
 
⌦a+1, da+1|⇡F
  |⌦a, da  ,(16)
where the expectation is simulated by Monte Carlo integration for every for every (⌦a, da). In
the backward recursion, F¯a+2
 
⌦a+1, da+1|⇡F
 
is a known constant because it is a polynomial
function of state space values in a+ 2. The state space elements at a+ 2 are determined by
the laws of motion.6
The approximating function in (16) is specified as
F¯a+2
 
⌦a+1, da+1|⇡F
 
= ⇡F1 x
v
a+2 + ⇡
F
2 x
p
a+2 + ⇡
F
3 x
f
a+2 + ⇡
F
4 x
m
a+2 (17)
+ ⇡F5 na+2 + ⇡
F
6 (a+ 2) + ⇡
F
7 (a+ 2)
2 .
Accumulated paid and volunteer work experience, marriage duration and the number of
children enter linearly as quadratic and higher order terms do not have an eﬀect. Time-
invariant elements of the state space, such as education and unobserved type, are excluded for
similar reasons. Note that age appears quadratically, allowing the future to have decreasing
influence as the finite-horizon is approached.
In contrast to approximation techniques that deal with the curse of dimensionality by
reducing the number of state space points for which E (Va+1 (⌦a+1) |⌦a, da) is evaluated
(see, e.g., Keane and Wolpin (1994) and Rust (1997)), the Geweke and Keane (1995) and
hybrid approaches ease the computational burden in the time dimension. The Geweke and
Keane (1995) technique approximates alternative-specific value functions at a by imbedding
a polynomial function of state space elements at a+1, using the laws of motion to capture the
forward-looking aspect of the model. The hybrid method incorporates more of the model’s
6In a full solution method, Fa+2 (⌦a+1, da+1) is a known constant because it is calculated in a previous
step of the backward recursion.
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structure by integrating over alternative-specific value functions at a + 1 and imbedding a
polynomial function of state space elements at a+2. Thus, the hybrid method more closely
mimics the Bellman principle.
In contrast to Wolpin (1992), which also employs an approximate solution technique
centered on the time dimension, decision-making periods do not become successively longer
as the finite-horizon is approached. The length of the period remains constant throughout.
Since the hybrid method can be thought of as imposing a terminal value function at a + 2
in each period a, it also diﬀers from solution techniques that use a terminal value function
at a reduced a (see, e.g., Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Blau and Gilleskie (2006,2008)).7
3.4 Performance of the Hybrid Method
The performance of the hybrid method is examined via Monte Carlo experiments. To fa-
cilitate the assessment, the data generating process (DGP) is the same four-alternative oc-
cupational choice model Keane and Wolpin (1994) use to test their approximation method.
The model is estimated using a version of the SML algorithm described below.
In the DGP, agents decide between four mutually exclusive options at the beginning of
each time period t. The options are work in occupation one (j = 1), work in occupation two
(j = 2), attend school (j = 3) or remain at home (j = 4). The utility flows are
Ut,1 = exp
 
↵10 + ↵11St + ↵12X1t   ↵13X21t + ↵14X2t   ↵15X22t + "1t
 
Ut,2 = exp
 
↵20 + ↵21St + ↵22X1t   ↵23X21t + ↵24X2t   ↵25X22t + "2t
 
Ut,3 =  0    1I (St   12)   2I (dt 6= 3) + "3t (18)
Ut,4 =  0 + "4t,
where Xjt, j = 1, 2, is the number of periods of work experience in occupation j at the
beginning of period t, St is the number of periods of completed schooling at the beginning
of period t, and the "jt, j = 1, .., 4, are serially uncorrelated productivity and preference
shocks. "jt v N (0,⌃1) where ⌃1 = ( ij) is the covariance matrix. The initial conditions are
S1 = 10 and X11 = X21 = 0.
The ↵ parameters in the occupation one and two wage oﬀer functions capture the returns
to schooling and experience.  0 is the consumption value of schooling.  1 is a constant
tuition rate for each year of post-secondary schooling.  2 is an additional cost incurred when
7The Keane and Wolpin (1994) technique was employed to solve earlier versions of the model. However,
the number of points for which E (Va+1 (⌦a+1) |⌦a, da) could be solved exactly, within a reasonable time
frame, was too small to produce reliable interpolations.
15
returning to school from occupation one or two, or from home in the previous period.  0 is
the value of the home alternative. The true parameter values are displayed in column (1)
of Table (6). This is Data Set One in Keane and Wolpin (1994). Column (2) reports the
absolute value of the mean bias in each parameter when the data are repeatedly generated
by a full solution of the model, but the model is estimated using the hybrid solution method.
Column (3) shows that the biases are negligible in magnitude for every parameter. The
t-stats of the bias are also never significant at the 5% level.
The bottom panel of Table (6) assesses the predictive accuracy of the hybrid method by
comparing the mean of the state variables after period 40 for both a full solution and the
hybrid method. The means are calculated at the true parameter values. After 40 decision
periods, the hybrid method over-predicts accumulated schooling by .86 years, under-predicts
accumulated experience in occupation one by 1.4 years and over-predicts accumulated ex-
perience in occupation two by .83 years. The deviation between the out-of-sample means
are negligible in magnitude for all three accumulated experience state variables. The results
in Table (6) suggest that the hybrid method can be reliably used for estimating structural
parameters and conducting certain types of policy simulations.8
4 Estimation
The parameters of the model are estimated by SML. For each trial vector of parameters, the
dynamic program is solved using the hybrid solution method, event histories are simulated,
and the likelihood function is constructed. The estimation procedure, originally developed
by Keane and Wolpin (2001) and made more general by Keane and Sauer (2009,2010),
accounts for the initial conditions problem and incorporates measurement error in discrete
and continuous outcomes. The algorithm is further extended in this study to account for
possible biases due to non-random missingness/attrition.
8One potential drawback of the hybrid method, as in the Geweke and Keane (1995) technique, is that
tweaks of structural parameters ✓S may not map clearly into corresponding tweaks of reduced-form pa-
rameters ⇡F . A referee also found preliminary evidence that the performance of the hybrid method may
deteriorate with the extent of permanent unobserved heterogeneity and/or age dependence. This was not
the case in the occupational choice model examined here.
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4.1 SML Procedure
Simulated choices are input into the likelihood function via classification rates. Classification
rates are joint probabilities of reported choices conditional on simulated choices. These
conditional choice probabilities take a logistic form, derived from an underlying classification
error model with a type 1 generalized extreme value distribution. By assuming independent
classification errors in the three dimensions of choice (employment, marriage, conception),
classification rates can be constructed for each choice in isolation.
Denote the reported employment choice of woman i at age a by d⇤ia = k and let dra = j,
r 2 R, be the rth simulated employment choice. Conditional on dra, there are six classifi-
cation rates, ⇡ejk = Pr (d⇤ia = k | dra = j), that obey the adding up constraint
P6
k=1 ⇡
e
jk = 1.
Identification of these classification rates is heavily based on deviations between actual and
predicted employment transitions. To further aid in identification, the 6⇥6 matrix of em-
ployment classification rates is partially restricted (see Table 9).
The classification rates for reported marital status m⇤ia and reported conception outcome
b⇤ia are denoted by ⇡mjk = Pr (m⇤ia = j | mra = k) and ⇡bjk = Pr (b⇤ia = j | bra = k), respectively.
mra and bra are the simulated counterparts to the reported outcomes. ⇡m11 and ⇡b11 are set close
to one in estimation, implying approximately no classification error in marriage and concep-
tion choices. Transition rates in these choice dimensions are fit well without incorporating
classification error.
The reported accepted wage w⇤ia is also allowed to be measured with error and is assumed
to be distributed lognormal with density
fw (w⇤ia) =
1
w⇤ia kv
p
2⇡
exp
 
 1
2

ln (w⇤ia)  w¯ka
 kv
 2!
(19)
where w¯ka, k = p, f , are the deterministic components of the part-time and full-time wage
oﬀer functions.  kv =
q
l233 +  
2
⌘,p for k = p, and  kv =
q
l243 + l
2
44 +  
2
⌘,f for k = f . The
density of reported husband wages, fh (h⇤ia), takes the same form after substituting in the
reported husband wage h⇤ia, w¯ha and  hv =
q
 2µ + l
2
54 + l
2
55 +  
2
⌘,h.
The new aspect of the SML procedure is the incorporation of non-response probabilities
which helps correct for biases due to non-random missingness/attrition. The non-response
probability is specified as
⇡nr = ⇡nr(dk,ra ,m
r
a, n
1,6r
a , n
7,18r
a , li,2003), (20)
where dk,ra is a set of employment choice dummies corresponding to simulated choice dra = k.
17
mra, n1,6ra and n7,18ra are simulated marriage and fertility outcomes. li,2003 is the reported
length of the interview (in minutes) in the 2003 wave. ⇡nr is logistic in form, implying that
the stochastic element in the non-response process is distributed type I generalized extreme
value.
Missingness/attrition is endogenous because preference and productivity shocks, and un-
observed type, aﬀect the probability of non-response via simulated outcomes. The length
of the interview li,2003 is included as a covariate because it provides a plausible source of
exogenous variation that helps identify ⇡nr. li,2003 is assumed to be randomly assigned after
controlling for endogenous employment, marriage and conception choices. It is non-zero for
individuals that answered the 2003 wave but did not respond in the 2005 wave. Length of
interview information is not available for the 2001 wave.
Note that the specification for ⇡nr would not be computationally practical in a non-
simulation based estimation procedure. The paths to the non-reported choices at age a
would have to be integrated out. Integrating out is circumvented because ⇡nr is conditional
on simulated outcomes, rather than reported outcomes. Adjusting for non-random missing-
ness is empirically important. In particular, it produces more conservative estimates of the
economic returns to volunteering.
The simulator for the likelihood contribution of woman i, conditional on unobserved type
Al and observed education level Ei, can be written as
ˆ`
i (D
⇤
i | Al, Ei, ✓) =
1
R
RX
r=1
a˜i+5Y
a=a˜i
(
6X
j=1
6X
k=1
⇡ejkI [d
r
a = j, d
⇤
ia = k]
)I(d⇤ia2D⇤i )
⇥ {fw (w⇤ia)}I(w
⇤
ia2D⇤i )
⇥
(
1X
j=0
1X
k=0
⇡mjkI [m
r
a = j,m
⇤
ia = k]
)I(m⇤ia2D⇤i )
(21)
⇥ {⇡m}I(mra 1=0,mra=1) ⇥  fh (h⇤ia) I(h⇤ia2D⇤i )
⇥
(
1X
j=0
1X
k=0
⇡bjkI [b
r
a = j, b
⇤
ia = k]
)I(b⇤ia2D⇤i )
⇥ {⇡nr}I(NR⇤ia=1) {1  ⇡nr}1 I(NR⇤ia=1)
where ✓ is the vector of parameters to be estimated and D⇤i = {d⇤ia,m⇤ia, b⇤ia, w⇤ia, h⇤ia}a˜i+5a=a˜i is
woman i’s history of reported employment states, marital states, birth outcomes, accepted
employment wage oﬀers, and accepted husband wage oﬀers. a˜i   25 is the age woman i
enters the sample. Note that a˜i is always greater than a = 21, the age at which simulation
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of choices begins. This constitutes the solution to the initial conditions problem.9
The indicator functions I [dra = j, d⇤ia = k], I [mra = j,m⇤ia = k], and I [bra = j, b⇤ia = k] “pick
out” the appropriate classification rates depending on the reported and simulated choice
combination at age a. The indicator functions I (d⇤ia 2 D⇤i ), I (m⇤ia 2 D⇤i ), I (b⇤ia 2 D⇤i ),
I (w⇤ia 2 D⇤i ) and I (h⇤ia 2 D⇤i ) are equal to one if the corresponding choices/wages at age
a are available in the data, and zero otherwise. If it is a survey year and woman i does not
respond, the indicator function I(NR⇤ia = 1) is equal to one, and zero otherwise.
The conditional likelihood contributions in (21) are weighted by the joint probability of
unobserved type and observed education level. Conditional on birth cohort Ci, the joint
probability is
⇡AE (Al, Ei | Ci) = ⇡A (Al | Ei, Ci) ⇡E (Ei | Ci) , l = 0, 1, 2, 3, (22)
where the ⇡A (·)’s are mass point probabilities corresponding to the four unobserved types
in the model. The ⇡E (·)’s are the probabilities of the three observed education levels. Ci
provides a plausible source of exogenous variation that helps identify the mixing distribu-
tion. The identifying assumption is birth cohort determines unobserved type and education
level, but conditional on type and education, birth cohort does not influence preferences,
productivity or constraints in the behavioral model.10
Weighting the conditional likelihood contributions yields
ˆ`
i
⇣
D⇤i , Ei | Ci, e✓⌘ =
"
3X
l=0
ˆ`
i (D
⇤
i | Al, Ei, ✓) ⇡A
 
Al | Ei, Ci, ✓A
 #
⇡E
 
Ei | Ci, ✓E
 
(23)
where e✓ =  ✓, ✓A, ✓E . ⇡A and ⇡E take logistic forms ensuring that probabilities lie in
the unit interval and sum to one. ✓A and ✓E are the mixing distribution parameters. The
simulated likelihood function is
QN
i=1
ˆ`
i
⇣
D⇤i , Ei | Ci, e✓⌘, where N is the number of women in
the sample. Standard errors are obtained by calculating numerical derivatives and the outer
product approximation to the Hessian.
9There are three education levels and four unobserved productivity types so the total number of event
histories simulated is 12 ⇤ R. R is set to 40. Analysis of the raw data suggests three education levels is
suﬃcient and more than four unobserved productivity types does not improve model fit. S = 20 is the
number of draws used to simulate expected future payoﬀs. Further increasing R and S does not lead to
important diﬀerences in point estimates or simulated outcomes.
10The cohort eﬀect Ci is defined as Ci = a˜i   22 and then discretized into three categories; i) Ci  15 ,
ii) 15 < Ci  25 and iii) Ci > 25. The first category contains women who are younger than the mean age
in the sample. Analysis of the raw data suggests that birth year is strongly correlated only with education
level, as captured in (22).
19
4.2 Identification
In static selection models, identification of selection-corrected returns to education or ex-
perience relies heavily on variables that enter the choice equation but not the outcome
equation (Heckman (1979)). In the DCDP model, the alternative-specific value functions
are analogous to the choice equation, and the wage oﬀer functions correspond to the outcome
equation. Exclusion restrictions are present because the alternative-specific value functions
contain all the elements of the state space, while wage oﬀers are determined by a subset of
state variables.
Wage oﬀers are viewed as arising from a human capital production function (see Keane
and Wolpin (1997)). General and specific skills, such as education and work experience (both
paid and unpaid), naturally enter the production function. It is less obvious that a woman’s
marital status, duration of marriage, husband’s productivity and the stock of children at
diﬀerent ages should be considered inputs. After controlling for the relationship between
chosen type of employment and marriage and fertility via preferences, any direct influence of
marriage and fertility outcomes on skill production is likely to be of second-order importance.
Hence, these latter variables are excluded from the wage oﬀer functions.
Identification of the non-economic returns to volunteering also relies on exclusion re-
strictions. Identification requires that the warm-glow function be excluded from the current
period returns of at least one of the alternative-specific value functions. This condition is
satisfied as warm glow enters the utility flows of the volunteering options only. Similarly,
unobserved consumption appears only in the budget constraint of the non-employed and
volunteer only options. Both unobserved consumption and warm glow are excluded from the
part-time only and full-time only utility flows.
The CRRA parameter is identified by transitions between part-time and full-time work
(accepted wage variation), marital status changes (non-labor income variation) and the birth
of children. These outcomes generate shifts in consumption levels that may be smoothed over
time. In particular, birth spacing plays an important role because it can be optimal from a
life cycle consumption perspective to have children in diﬀerent age groups. The implications
of marriage, birth frequency and spacing for identification of the CRRA parameter, and
hence unpaid and paid employment choices, highlights an additional reason marriage and
fertility decisions are profitably included in a labor supply model.
Identification can also be understood via a simple analogy to the method of moments.
The parameters of the female wage oﬀer functions are tightly tied to the observed wage
data and the employment choice distribution. The parameters of the husband wage oﬀer
function, also selection-corrected, are similarly tied to the observed husband wage data
and marriage choices. Unobserved consumption (b), warm glow (g), childcare costs (ck),
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the utility function parameters (µk,  ,  m, and  n), the marriage oﬀer probability (⇡m),
expected future payoﬀs (⇡F ), and the extent of income sharing (⌧m) are free parameters
that are related to observed moments through cross-equation restrictions. There is a very
large number of observed moments that are implicitly taken into account in estimation.
These include the employment choice distribution and transition rates, marriage rates and
durations, birth rates and timing, and the distributions of accepted part-time, full-time and
husband wages.11
5 Estimation Results
Because there are 106 estimated parameters, only key point estimates are discussed. Param-
eter estimates and asymptotic standard errors are reported in Tables 7 through 9. To assess
model fit, simulated outcomes at the SML estimates are compared to corresponding out-
comes in the raw data. Simulated outcomes are adjusted to take into account measurement
error and non-response.
5.1 Parameter Estimates
Part-time and full-time wage oﬀers increase sharply with education level and diﬀer substan-
tially by unobserved type. Type 1 women, constituting 9.1% of the population, are the
least productive in both part-time and full-time jobs. Type 2 and 3 women are the most
productive in both types of paid work (48.3% and 20.0% of the population, respectively).
The probability of being Type 3, the highest productivity woman, increases with education
level and is higher in more recent birth cohorts.
In contrast to the negative returns to volunteer experience generally found in reduced-
form wage regressions, the estimated wage oﬀer functions reveal significantly positive returns.
Each year of volunteer experience increases wage oﬀers in part-time work by 8.5% and by
2.6% in full-time work. These returns are especially substantial considering the relatively
limited number of hours per week devoted to volunteering. This suggests that signaling
11Functional form assumptions and parametric distributions for wage oﬀers also help identify non-wage
parameters (see Flinn and Heckman (1982)). Parameters associated with unobserved types are identified by
observed persistence in wages and choices. Although the discount factor is theoretically identified (Wolpin
(1987)), it is fixed at 0.95. Several other identification considerations were mentioned earlier, e.g., exogenous
variation in non-response probabilities and the mixing distribution. See also Geweke and Keane (2001) for
an identification analysis related to ⇡F .
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may be an important component of the wage returns. There are no other estimates in the
literature to which these volunteer wage oﬀer returns can be directly compared.
The returns to working for free suggest substantial investment value. However, volunteer-
ing has costs in terms of the disutility of work eﬀort. The µˆk estimates show that full-time
work is more costly than part-time work, and volunteering adds disutility when it is com-
bined with either of these paid work options. An additional factor aﬀecting the investment
motive, discussed in detail below, is the curvature of the consumption component of utility.
The estimate of the CRRA parameter ( ˆ = .273), is close to previous estimates produced
by DCDP labor supply models which explicitly incorporate data on assets. Imai and Keane
(2004), Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008) and Keane and Wolpin (2001) obtain  ˆ’s of .26,
.40 and .48, respectively. Point estimates in this range imply a higher willingness to substi-
tute consumption inter-temporally than what is often found in the life cycle consumption
literature with non-separable labor supply (see Keane, Todd and Wolpin (2010)).
Regarding the consumption motive, the non-economic returns to volunteering increase
with education but do not vary much with age. Compared to women with no children,
women with young children dislike volunteering, while women with older children experience
considerably more warm glow. This pattern is suggestive of a substitutability between in-
formal volunteering to raise one’s own young children and formal volunteering for charitable
organizations.
Estimates directly related to the marriage decision indicate that husband wage oﬀers
increase with a woman’s education level and are quadratic in her age. Idiosyncratic variance
constitutes 5.4% of total variance, with the remainder due to the husband individual eﬀect.
The income sharing parameter is 43.5%, meaning that a woman consumes 43.5 cents of every
dollar of net household income. Keane and Wolpin (2010) find a somewhat higher sharing
parameter (54.6%). The estimated probability of receiving a marriage oﬀer during the year
is 9.1%. Perhaps surprisingly, the utility of marriage increases significantly with its duration.
The estimated childcare cost function shows that annual costs increase with the amount
of time devoted to the labor market. The per-child costs of children younger than 7 are
$19,789, $22,466, and $25,994 when non-employed, working part-time and working full-time,
respectively. Children between the ages of 7 and 18 cost 40.2%more than younger children in
each labor market state. Child start-up costs are estimated to be $30,049. This is comparable
to the monetary equivalent of the disutility of pregnancy estimated in Keane and Wolpin
(2010). Additional childcare costs when volunteering are estimated to be $5,025 per-child.
Ignoring start-up costs and discounting, the estimates imply that the total costs of raising
a child through age 18 are $481,713 (in 2010 dollars). This is a lower bound estimate because
it assumes a woman is always non-employed. Assuming a woman always works full-time and
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volunteers produces an upper bound estimate of $623,336. The lower bound is 49% higher
than the upper bound of $322,560 estimated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA),
using the Consumer Expenditure Survey. This confirms the suspicion that the USDA cost
estimates are downward biased (see Lind (2010)).12
5.2 Model Fit
A comparison of the actual and simulated employment choice distribution, over the age
range 25-55, is shown in the top panel of Table 10. The estimated model fits the choice
distribution very well. There is only a small under-prediction in the part-time only state
and an over-prediction of similarly small magnitude in the full-time and volunteer state. The
slight changes by age in the choice distribution are also generally reproduced by the model.
Table 11 displays the actual and predicted two-period (one-wave) employment transition
matrices. The transition rates are fit very well. In the raw data, 23.5% transit to volun-
teer jobs from the non-employment state, and 40.2% transit to paid employment from the
volunteer only state. The corresponding figures produced by the estimated model are 25%
and 39.2%, respectively. From the part-time and volunteer option, most transitions in the
raw data are into full-time work, and from the full-time and volunteer option, the largest
transition rate is into full-time work only. Both of these important patterns are accurately
reproduced by the model. The only relatively large deviation between actual and predicted
transition rates is the proportion that remains in the volunteer only state. However, this is
the category with the smallest overall frequency in the choice distribution.
The middle and bottom panels of Table 10 illustrate the ability of the model to fit mean
accepted wage outcomes and the distribution of accumulated volunteer experience. The
diﬀerences between actual and predicted mean accepted wages are negligible in magnitude.
The standard deviations of accepted wages are accurately reproduced as well, although there
is an under-estimate for husband wages. The actual and predicted proportions of volunteer
experience between 0 and 3 years are also within the same range. The proportion with 1 and
2 years of experience is slightly over-predicted and the proportion with 3 years of experience
is correspondingly under-predicted. However, the sharp drop oﬀ between 1 and 3 years of
accumulated volunteer experience is accurately reproduced. The model’s explanation for
why the tail of the distribution falls oﬀ sharply will be discussed below.
12The point estimate of annual unobserved income is bˆ = 4, 658. This seems somewhat low. However,
fixing b at various higher levels, rather than estimating it, hurts model fit. Other estimates not discussed
for the sake of brevity include the utility of children, the Cholesky elements, the approximation of expected
future payoﬀs, classification rates, measurement error variances and the probability of non-response.
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The fit to marriage and birth outcomes is shown in Table 12. The actual and predicted
proportions in the married state and the actual and predicted transition rates between mar-
riage and divorce are all very close. The same is true for the actual and predicted proportions
giving birth and the actual and predicted proportions giving birth by marital status.13
6 Discussion
6.1 Negative Selection into Volunteering
Volunteering is an optimal choice in the model when the non-economic returns and the
expected future economic returns suﬃciently outweigh the disutility of unpaid work eﬀort
and volunteering-related childcare costs. According to the structural estimates, this outcome
occurs most often amongst highly educated, low market-productivity women. Thus, the
behavioral model reveals a negative selection mechanism capable of explaining why reduced
form estimates of the wage returns to working for free are downward biased.
Highly educated women tend to volunteer more often because the non-economic returns
increase with education level. However, conditional on observed education, the lower is a
woman’s unobserved market-productivity, the higher are the benefits from future wage re-
turns. Low market-productivity implies low wage oﬀers and consumption levels, and hence
higher marginal utilities of consumption. Heterogeneity in the marginal utility of consump-
tion arises from the estimated curvature of the consumption component of utility, i.e., the
CRRA parameter. Once this negative selection based on unobserved market-productivity
and diﬀerential marginal utilities is accounted for, the future wage returns to working for
free become positive.
It is worth emphasizing that both diﬀerential unobserved market-productivity and suf-
ficient curvature of the utility function are necessary to generate negative selection. Had
the estimated model produced a substantially higher CRRA parameter, negative selection
would not have arisen. For example, with a linear utility flow, the marginal utilities of
future consumption would be uniform for all productivity types and selection into volunteer-
ing would be driven solely by the positive relationship between education and unobserved
non-economic returns. That is, positive selection based on warm-glow would have resulted.
Note that negative selection could have been generated even in a linear utility context
if low market-productivity women had diﬀerentially higher wage oﬀer returns to volunteer-
ing. However, diﬀerential wage returns by productivity type (random coeﬃcients) were not
13More powerful approaches to model validation, such as those pursued by Arcidiacono, Sieg and Sloan
(2007), are diﬃcult to implement in the current context.
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empirically identified. The CRRA parameter is easier to identify because it is a direct func-
tion of more moments in the data, e.g., accepted wages, employment and marriage choice
frequencies, and birth spacing.
The negative selection mechanism revealed by the model also helps explain the inverse
u-shaped age pattern in the part-time and volunteer state, and the sharp drop oﬀ in the
distribution of volunteer experience. Low market-productivity is an initial condition (an
endowment) and does not change over time. However, other dimensions of productivity
can adjust and lead to higher wage oﬀers. In particular, low market-productivity types
that choose the part-time and volunteer state gain both part-time and volunteer experience.
The eﬀect is that wage oﬀers in part-time and full-time work permanently increase, con-
sumption levels rise, and the marginal utility of consumption falls. As the marginal utility
of consumption falls, volunteering tapers oﬀ. Low market-productivity types who increase
their productivity through the accumulation of paid work and volunteer experience begin to
make decisions more in line with women who have a high market-productivity endowment.
Volunteering then becomes less frequent and driven mostly by warm glow.
To further illustrate the ability of the estimated model to correct wage returns for negative
selection, Table 13 presents the results of reduced-form wage regressions using simulated data.
The specifications are analogous to those run on the actual data, and reported in columns
(7) and (8) of Table 5. The regressions on simulated data produce positive wage returns
both without and with controls for unobserved type (4.4% and 4.9%, respectively).
The regressions in Table 13 also facilitate a comparison of the returns to education,
volunteer and paid work experience implied by the model. Column (8) shows that the 4.9%
increase in mean accepted wages from having volunteered two years earlier is slightly less
than half the increase in mean accepted wages from having worked part-time (11.9%). The
corresponding magnitude for having worked full-time is much higher (72.1%). The returns
to education are similarly large in magnitude. Having acquired between 12 and 16 years
of education increases mean accepted wages by 55.8% compared to the base group with
less than 12 years of education. The corresponding return to acquiring more than 16 years
of education is 115.2%. The large coeﬃcients for unobserved types clearly illustrate the
importance of unobserved market-productivity.14
14The simulated data are not adjusted for classification error, measurement error or non-response. The
simulated data are based only on parameters that represent the “true” economy, not on what may or may
not be reported in data.
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6.2 Relative Importance of Economic and Non-economic Returns
The estimation results imply that both the consumption and investment motives play im-
portant roles in the volunteering decision. But which motive is relatively more important
in the decision to oﬀer labor services for free? The previous literature has yet to provide
relative importance estimates. In order to address this question, the model is simulated
shutting down the non-economic and economic returns to volunteering. The non-economic
and economic returns are then re-introduced into the model sequentially.
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 14 report the results of the simulation exercise. As expected,
there is no volunteering when there are zero benefits and positive costs. Opening up the non-
economic returns (warm glow) increases the incidence of volunteering from zero to 28.3%.
The total proportion further increases to 30.0% when economic returns (wage oﬀer eﬀects
of volunteer experience) are added. Although the total proportion only slightly increases
with the addition of economic returns, the frequencies across the three volunteering options
change substantially.
With warm glow only, 13.9% of all volunteering is in the part-time and volunteering
state, and 66.4% is in the full-time and volunteer state. Adding economic returns, the
proportion in the part-time and volunteer state increases sharply from 13.9% to 24.0%. It
is mainly low market-productivity women (type 1) who volunteer in this latter state. High
market-productivity women (types 2 and 3) tend to volunteer in the full-time and volunteer
state. The implication is that the economic returns are relatively more important for low
market-productivity types and the non-economic returns are relatively more important for
high market-productivity women.
By examining changes in lifetime utility, it is possible to make a more general claim,
i.e., the importance of economic returns far outweighs the importance of non-economic re-
turns in the population as a whole. With the introduction of non-economic returns, lifetime
utility increases from 5997.75 to 6009.42. Adding economic returns, lifetime utility further
increases to 6041.79. Thus, working for free increases mean lifetime utility by 7.34% and
the economic returns account for 73.5% of this total increase. The economic benefit to low
market-productivity women drives the sharp rise in mean lifetime utility. Overall, volunteer-
ing increases mean lifetime earnings by a substantial 16.7%.15
15In the context of charitable monetary donations, Sieg and Zhang (2011) measure the relative importance
of private benefits (e.g., invitations to dinner parties) and warm glow. They also find that private benefits
are relatively more important than warm glow in determining donations in the majority of organizations
that oﬀer such benefits.
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6.3 Tax Policy
Charitable time and money donations are not treated symmetrically in the US tax code. For
itemizers, monetary donations are generally tax-deductible at the highest marginal tax rate.
The tax-deductibility of monetary donations reduces the cost of giving money and encourages
philanthropic activity of this type (see Auten, Sieg and Clotfelter (2002)). Volunteering is
not directly encouraged in a similar way. For example, the US Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) permits a tax credit to be received for childcare expenses if the purpose of the expense
is to allow one to work. However, the IRS will not oﬀer the tax credit for volunteer work.
Column (1) of Table 15 reports the results of a simulation exercise which sets the ad-
ditional cost of childcare to zero when one volunteers. This corresponds to a childcare tax
credit for volunteer work. The tax credit increases the total proportion volunteering from
30.0% to 36.9%, implying a 23.1% rise in volunteer labor supply. In percentage terms, the
bulk of the increase is in the volunteer only and part-time and volunteer states. The higher
incidence of unpaid work leads to an increase in mean accepted wages of 1.04% and an
increase in mean lifetime earnings of 1.92%.
The increase in mean lifetime earnings of 1.92% corresponds to a benefit of $6,338 per
woman. However, the “social” cost of providing tax relief is $25,487 per woman. Social cost is
defined as a subsidy equivalent, in which 100% of volunteering-related childcare costs ($5,024
per-child) enter a discounted sum each period a woman volunteers. Thus, the increase in
mean lifetime earnings covers only 24.9% of the mean lifetime social cost of providing tax-
relief. Note that this is probably an upper bound on the shortfall in social welfare. The policy
simulation does not take into account a possible increase in the husband’s volunteering and
lifetime earnings. In addition, there are likely to be many other net social benefits from more
volunteer work in society, including poverty reduction, less crime, increased human capital
of children and youth, and more charitable giving of money.
7 Conclusion
Volunteering is both a non-economic and economic activity that has not been extensively
analyzed by economists. In this study, the returns to volunteering are estimated using data
on female respondents in the PSID. The behavioral model assumes that a woman maximizes
the discounted present value of expected lifetime utility by making joint and sequential
decisions on unpaid and paid work, marital status and the conception of children.
The contemporaneous utility flow in the model is specified as CRRA in consumption with
an additively separable component that captures the non-economic returns to volunteering.
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This specification nests the investment and consumption motives for volunteering into one
unified model, providing a new empirical strategy for directly estimating their relative im-
portance.
The DCDP model is solved using a novel approximate solution technique, and the struc-
tural parameters are estimated by an SML procedure that is extended to adjust for biases
due to non-random missingness/attrition. The SML estimates indicate that both the non-
economic and economic returns to volunteering are substantial. In particular, an additional
year of volunteer experience raises future wage oﬀers in part-time work by 8.5% and by 2.6%
in full-time work. Working for free increases mean lifetime earnings by 16.7%.
The behavioral model also reveals an adverse selection mechanism that helps explain
why reduced-form wage regressions are likely to yield downward biased returns to volun-
teering. According to the structural estimates, highly-educated, low market-productivity
women volunteer most often. This is because non-economic returns increase with education,
and conditional on education, lower market-productivity implies greater benefits from fu-
ture wage returns. Women with low initial market-productivity levels benefit more from the
economic returns because they have higher marginal utilities of consumption. Diﬀerential
marginal utilities of consumption arise from the estimated curvature of the consumption
component of the utility flow.
A simulation exercise that sequentially introduces non-economic and economic returns
into the model provides the first estimates of the relative importance of the investment and
consumption motives in the context of volunteering. The results indicate that the economic
returns account for 73.5% of the increase in lifetime utility from volunteer experience. Thus,
the investment motive far outweighs the consumption motive.
The policy implications of the model are highlighted by simulating the introduction of
a tax credit for volunteering-related childcare expenses. The tax credit produces a 23.1%
increase in volunteer labor supply and a 1.92% increase in mean lifetime earnings. However,
the increase in lifetime earnings covers only 24.9% of the costs of providing tax relief. This is
probably an upper bound on the shortfall in social welfare since there are likely to be many
other net social benefits from more volunteer work in society.
Future research could expand the model in several ways. First, heterogeneity in the
returns to volunteering depending on type of organization could be analyzed with better
data. Second, charitable monetary donations could be introduced into the decision problem.
Money and time donations may be either substitutes or complements, implying that tax relief
on time donations could aﬀect monetary donations as well. Third, a more explicit house-
hold decision making model could be formulated, incorporating richer interactions between
spouses in the dimension of volunteer work.
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Table 1: Weekly Volunteer Hours
% Volunteer Standard Percentile
Year (Hours >0) Mean Deviation 10 25 50 75 90
2000 29.5 2.17 3.75 .29 .48 .96 1.92 4.81
2002 30.4 4.04 8.63 .19 .58 1.58 4.23 8.06
2004 34.7 3.49 7.41 .23 .58 1.73 3.69 7.31
Helping Children
the or Poor Senior Social
Year Needy Religious Youth Health Citizens Change Other Total
2000 .124 - - - - - .876 1.00
2002- .042 .410 .352 .044 .037 .032 .083 1.00
2004
Note: The distributions in the top panel are for non-zero weekly volunteer hours, computed from annual
totals. The bottom panel contains row percentages for non-zero hours.
32
Table 2: Sample Means by Frequency of Survey Response
Full Respond Respond
Sample 3 Waves < 3 Waves
(1) (2) (3)
Volunteer .338 .350 .200
(.473) (.477) (.401)
Non-employed .101 .099 .122
(.301) (.298) (.328)
Part-time .318 .321 .273
(.466) (.467) (.446)
Full-time .531 .526 .586
(.499) (.499) (.493)
Married .748 .796 .459
(.434) (.403) (.498)
Children 1.82 1.86 1.57
(1.31) (1.27) (1.49)
Female Wage 29.43 29.50 28.69
(25.78) (26.09) (21.75)
Husband Wage 56.25 56.67 50.05
(64.93) (66.06) (45.12)
Age 37.73 38.17 35.05
(7.68) (7.63) (7.43)
Education 13.66 13.69 13.46
(2.43) (2.44) (2.34)
N 2,479 2,129 350
Note: Wages are in 2005 constant dollars (thousands). N is the number of women. Standard deviations are
in parentheses.
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Table 3: Employment Choice Distribution
Non- Volunteer Part-time Full-time Part-time & Full-time & Woman-
Employed Only Only Only Volunteer Volunteer Years
Age (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
25-29 .117 .027 .229 .409 .090 .128 743
30-34 .129 .058 .213 .348 .109 .142 1,252
35-39 .088 .063 .210 .347 .112 .180 1,264
40-44 .091 .054 .195 .346 .155 .160 1,396
45-49 .092 .049 .175 .376 .123 .185 1,338
50-55 .093 .041 .174 .376 .110 .206 933
25-55 .101 .051 .198 .363 .120 .168 6,926
Note: Figures are row percentages. Percentages are computed conditional on non-missing employment
choices.
Table 4: Two-Year Employment Transition Matrix
Age+2
Non- Volunteer Part-time Full-time Part-time & Full-time &
Employed Only Only Only Volunteer Volunteer
Age (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non- .496 .157 .186 .082 .056 .022
Employed
Volunteer .159 .439 .070 .037 .229 .065
Only
Part-time .097 .024 .431 .266 .120 .063
Only
Full-time .054 .009 .146 .617 .034 .140
Only
Part-time & .042 .066 .198 .106 .424 .164
Volunteer
Full-time & .022 .015 .075 .273 .122 .492
Volunteer
Note: Figures are row percentages. Percentages are computed conditional on non-missing employment
choices.
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Table 5: Reduced-Form Regressions
Log
Husband
Volunteer Marriage Birth Wage Log Accepted Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant -.701 -1.035 .337 7.881 8.990 8.988 7.646 8.029
(.168) (.142) (.113) (.328) (.331) (.443) (.419) (.493)
I(12Edu<16) .237 .097 .023 .518 .664 .678 .484 .563
(.021) (.028) (.009) (.059) (.056) (.068) (.063) (.086)
I(Edu 16) .418 .151 .066 .866 1.117 1.139 .935 1.007
(.024) (.029) (.010) (.063) (.059) (.073) (.068) (.091)
Age .030 .076 -.013 .092 -.009 -.003 .023 .008
(.009) (.007) (.006) (.017) (.017) (.022) (.020) (.024)
Age-squared -.0004 -.0008 .00004 -.0009 .0003 .0002 -.0001 .0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0002) (.0002) (.0003) (.0002) (.0003)
Married .040 .045
(.015) (.004)
#kids .077 .044
(.012) (.005)
#kids-squared -.0095 -.0032
(.0025) (.0013)
Volunteer(t-2) -.143 -.069 -.038
(.034) (.031) (.028)
Part-time(t-2) .681 .633
(.093) (.082)
Full-time(t-2) 1.365 .959
(.090) (.080)
⇢ .371 .805 .000 .666 .669
N 2,479 2,479 1,988 1,890 2,305 2,032 2,032 2,032
NT 6,926 12,395 8,953 4,798 5,877 3,707 3,707 3,707
R2 .073 .024 .073 .101 .098 .100 .271 .245
Note: ⇢ is the fraction of variance due to the random eﬀect. N is the number of women. NT is the number
of woman-year observations. Column (3) includes only women less than 46 years old. The employment
status dummies (Volunteer(t-2), Part-time(t-2), and Full-time(t-2)) refer to the prior wave (2 years earlier).
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 6: Monte Carlo Estimation Results and Predictive Accuracy
True t-stat
Value Bias of Bias
Parameter (1) (2) (3)
↵10 9.21 .0064 .35
↵11 .038 .0015 1.42
↵12 .033 .00002 .94
↵13 .0005 .000001 .26
↵14 0 .000001 .28
↵15 0 .0004 .31
↵20 8.48 .0183 .83
↵21 .070 .0032 1.71
↵22 .067 .0000008 .09
↵23 .001 0.0105 .97
↵24 .022 0.0006 .27
↵25 .0005 0.0019 1.11
 0 0 .00003 .07
 1 0 .00005 .26
 2 4,000 47.78 .35
 0 17,750 1,599.1 .75
( 11)
1
2 .20 .0019 .20
( 22)
1
2 .25 .0038 .89
( 33)
1
2 1,500 38.06 .29
( 44)
1
2 1,500 7.85 .07
Mean of State Variables After Period 40
Schooling Occ. 1 Occ. 2
(1) (2) (3)
Full Solution 12.84 11.79 24.80
Hybrid Solution 13.70 10.40 25.63
Note: Based on 25 sets of 100 individuals. The bias is the absolute value of ✓ˆ   ✓, where ✓ denotes the true value in column
(1) and ✓ˆ = 125
P25
j=1 ✓ˆj . The t-stat is the absolute value of
⇣
✓ˆ ✓
 
✓ˆ
⌘p
25 where  ✓ˆ =

1
24
P25
j=1
⇣
✓ˆ   ✓j
⌘2 
. In the calculation
of state variables after period 40, true values are used.
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Table 7: SML Estimates
Part-time Full-time Husband Unobserved Warm Approx
Wage Wage Wage Income Glow Emax
ln (wpa) ln
 
wfa
 
ln
 
wha
 
b g F¯a+2 (·)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 7.521 8.451 8.447 4,658 -1.609
(.005) (.007) (.007) (16.21) (.006)
E1 .083 .432 .531 3.362
(.001) (.002) (.002) (.011)
E2 .644 .958 .916 3.766
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.017)
A1 -1.127 -.917
(.013) (.009)
A2 1.059 .551
(.004) (.003)
A3 1.939 1.166
(.006) (.005)
xva .085 .026 .048
(.0003) (.0002) (.002)
xpa .034 .030 .191
(.0003) (.0003) (.004)
(xpa)
2 -.004
(.00004)
xfa .003 .035 .719
(.00004) (.0002) (.007) 
xfa
 2 -.0004
(.000004)
xma 4.384
(.083)
na 1.413
(.012)
n1,6a -1.516
(.014)
n7,18a 3.794
(.019)
a .078 .0020 13.580
(.0001) (.0001) (.206)
a2 -.0009 -.242
(.000002) (.002)
 µ .587
(.002)
 "a .018 .135 .118 4.363 4.266
(.001) (.002) (.001) (.022) (.014)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 8: SML Estimates (cont’d)
Marriage Children Type Education Attrition
Utility Utility Probs Probs Prob
 m  n ⇡A1 ⇡
A
2 ⇡
A
3 ⇡
E
1 ⇡
E
2 ⇡
nr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant -.385 1.088 .5697 2.014 1.476 -.622
(.467) (.288) (.316) (.114) (.120) (.166)
E1 -.498 -.1526 .3646
(.487) (.298) (.323)
E2 -.199 -.5566 .1460
(.491) (.305) (.331)
C1 -.146 -.0032 -1.137 .027 -.195
(.230) (.152) (.164) (.171) (.180)
C2 -.719 -.2290 -1.831 .566 .507
(.379) (.204) (.262) (.311) (.322)
xma 5.061
(.137)
na 14.280
(.085)
n2a -4.054
(.021)
mana 15.750
(.091)
man2a -1.719
(.012)
Vol .269
(.176)
PT -.129
(.274)
FT .571
(.163)
ma -1.967
(.152)
n1,6a .394
(.151)
n7,18a -1.159
(.301)
l2003 -.042
(.004)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 9: SML Estimates (cont’d)
Income Marriage
CRRA Disutility of Work Eﬀort Sharing Oﬀer Prob
1    µ1 µ2 µ3 µ4 µ5 µ6 ⌧ 1 ⇡m
.273 1.0000 .9982 .9980 .9162 .9551 .8720 .435 .091
(.0010) (.0009) (.0007) (.0005) (.0008) (.0006) (.002) (.0003)
Child Care Costs
Birth Nonemp Vol PT FT ↵c
30,049 19,789 5,024 22,446 25,993 1.402
(101.2) (41.9) (29.6) (49.2) (66.1) (.006)
Switching Costs Cholesky Elements Measurement Error
s1 s3 s4 l21 l43 l54  ⌘,p  ⌘,f  ⌘,h
3.009 4.440 4.547 2.028 -.014 -.077 .284 .387 .444
(.015) (.014) (.014) (.010) (.0006) (.0008) (.0009) (.003) (.007)
Classification Error
Employment Marriage
⇡ejk ⇡
m
jk
.9955 .0009 .0009 .0009 .0009 .0009 .9820 .0180
.0009 .9955 .0009 .0009 .0009 .0009 .0180 .9820
.0009 .0009 .9955 .0009 .0009 .0009 Birth
.0008 .0008 .1429 .8540 .0008 .0008 ⇡bjk
.0008 .0008 .1632 .0008 .8337 .0008 .9820 .0180
.0007 .0007 .0007 .1224 .1288 .7468 .0180 .9820
Note: The employment classification error matrix is generated from four parameters with estimated values
5.212 (.044), 5.369 (.084), 5.191 (.081) and 5.243 (.067). Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 10: Actual and Predicted Employment Outcomes
Non- Volunteer Part-time Full-time Part-time & Full-time &
Employed Only Only Only Volunteer Volunteer
.101 .051 .198 .363 .120 .168
(.988) (.051) (.183) (.369) (.117) (.181)
Mean Mean Mean Mean
Accepted Accepted Accepted Accepted
Wage Part-time Wage Full-time Wage Husband Wage
29,451 17,825 36,271 55,440
(31,811) (18,434) (39,126) (58,797)
Distribution Volunteer Work Experience
0 1 2 3 4 5
.487 .221 .152 .140 0 0
(.421) (.275) (.191) (.114) (0) (0)
Note: Predicted values are in parentheses.
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Table 11: Actual and Predicted Two-Year Employment Transition Matrix
a+ 2
Non- Volunteer Part-time Full-time Part-time & Full-time &
Employed Only Only Only Volunteer Volunteer
a (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non- .496 .157 .186 .082 .056 .022
Employed (.541) (.178) (.157) (.052) (.056) (.016)
Volunteer .159 .439 .070 .037 .229 .065
Only (.247) (.360) (.116) (.034) (.196) (.046)
Part-time .097 .024 .431 .266 .120 .063
Only (.083) (.048) (.400) (.268) (.116) (.085)
Full-time .054 .009 .146 .617 .034 .140
Only (.025) (.008) (.126) (.656) (.033) (.153)
Part-time & .042 .066 .198 .106 .424 .164
Volunteer (.038) (.027) (.190) (.119) (.458) (.167)
Full-time & .022 .015 .075 .273 .122 .492
Volunteer (.011) (.006) (.121) (.259) (.106) (.497)
Note: Figures are row percentages. Predicted values are in parentheses.
Table 12: Actual and Predicted Marriage and Birth Outcomes
Single Married
Mother Mother
Married Birth Birth Birth
.748 .060 .023 .074
(.751) (.063) (.023) (.081)
Marital Status
a+2
a Single Married
Single .799 .201
(.805) (.195)
Married .029 .971
(.023) (.977)
Note: Birth percentages are for a  45. Predicted values are in parentheses.
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Table 13: Reduced-Form Wage Regressions (Simulated Data)
Log Accepted Wage
(1) (2)
Constant 7.093 7.251
(.023) (.012)
I(12Edu<16) .523 .558
(.003) (.001)
I(Edu 16) .939 1.152
(.003) (.002)
Age .027 .010
(.001) (.0006)
Age-squared .00002 .0002
(.00002) (.00001)
Type 1 -1.189
(.006)
Type 2 .720
(.002)
Type 3 1.450
(.002)
Volunteer(t-2) .044 .049
(.003) (.001)
Part-time(t-2) .804 .119
(.007) (.004)
Full-time(t-2) 1.480 .721
(.006) (.004)
R¯2 .5005 .8708
N 480
NT 16,320
Note: N is the number of simulated women. NT is the number of simulated woman-year observations.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 14: Relative Importance
No Non-Economic Only Economic and
or Economic Non-economic Non-economic
Returns Returns Returns
(1) (2) (3)
Volunteer (Total) .0000 .2828 .3001
Non-employed .2337 .1678 .1439
Volunteer Only .0000 .0557 .0364
Part-time Only .1350 .1034 .1334
Full-time Only .6313 .4461 .4226
Part-time & Volunteer .0000 .0394 .0719
Full-time & Volunteer .0000 .1877 .1918
Married .6995 .6995 .6990
Total Fertility .5156 .5115 .5260
Husband Wage 47,332 47,332 47,394
Accepted Wage 25,671 25,503 29,838
Lifetime Earnings 282,233 284,020 329,445
(0.63) (16.73)
Lifetime Utility 5997.75 6009.42 6041.79
(1.95) (7.34)
Note: Lifetime figures are discounted between the ages of 22 and 55. Lifetime earnings includes zeros.
Percentage increase from column (1) figures in parentheses.
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Table 15: Child Care Tax Credit for Volunteering
Tax
Baseline Credit
(1) (2)
Volunteer (Total) .3001 .3695
(23.1)
Non-employed .1439 .1189
Volunteer Only .0364 .0432
Part-time Only .1334 .1356
Full-time Only .4226 .3759
Part-time & Volunteer .0719 .1092
Full-time & Volunteer .1918 .2172
Married .6990 .6990
Total Fertility .5260 .5298
Husband Wage 47,394 47,394
Accepted Wage 29,838 30,153
(1.04)
Lifetime Earnings 329,445 335,783
(1.92)
Lifetime Utility 6041.79 6056.51
(0.24)
Program Evaluation
Lifetime Subsidy 25,487
Lifetime Earnings Benefit 6,338
Net Cost Per Volunteer 19,149
Note: Lifetime figures are discounted between the ages of 22 and 55. Lifetime earnings includes zeros.
Percentage increase from column (1) figures in parentheses.
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